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HUMAN RIGHTS, MORAL OBLIGATIONS, 
AND DIVINE COMMANDS 
Ton van den Beld 
The principal question which I set out to answer is whether, since moral 
rights and obligations stand or fall together, the latter can stand, that is, 
whether they are real and inescapable. The argument initially unfolds as a 
rmming comment on the development of Bernard Williams's moral think-
ing. The reason is that his thought nicely exemplifies an interesting connec-
tion between a particular religious and moral scepticism. A first conclusion 
is that a morality of real, inescapable and -for the agent-sometimes costly 
obligations and their correlative rights, while being at home in a theistic 
metaphysic, fits in badly with metaphysical, atheistic naturalism. The second 
conclusion is that Christine Korsgaard's impressive ethical project, which is 
neutral towards theism and atheism, fails to give a satisfying account of such 
obligations. My final claim is that a theistic account in terms of a strong di-
vine command theory succeeds where non-theistic and atheistic accounts 
seem to founder. 
Introduction 
Richard Rorty's 1993 Oxford Amnesty Lecture on human rights is perhaps 
the most challenging work on human rights to have appeared in a long 
time. In it he rejects the idea of human rights being based one way or an-
other in human nature. There is no knowledge of human nature, nor of 
any other kind that philosophers like Plato, Aquinas, and Kant hoped to 
get, to support human rights. In fact human rights are altogether without 
foundations.! Yet Rorty acknowledges his pride in being part of the hu-
man rights culture, his pride being no more external to his self than is his 
"desire for financial or sexual success." But his pride and his being part 
of the human rights culture are contingent matters. They are beyond the 
reach of justification. He happens to be in favour of that particular cul-
ture. His sentiments have been manipulated, like those of his students, in 
such a way that he and they can imagine themselves in the shoes of the 
despised and oppressed. Thus, Rorty avers: "The more youngsters like 
this we can raise, the stronger and more global our human rights culture 
will become."2 
Rorty's support of the human rights culture reminds us of his backing 
of Western liberal democratic ideas in his Contingency, Irony and Solidarity. 
Here too the arguments are avowedly circular, part of a new vocabulary 
which happens to convince people. "There is," says Rorty, "no neutral, 
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non circular way to defend the liberal's claim that cruelty is the worst thing 
we do, any more than there is a neutral way to back up Nietzsche's asser-
tion that this claim expresses a resentful, slavish attitude .... We cannot 
look back behind the processes of socialisation which convinced us twen-
tieth century liberals of the validity of this claim and appeal to something 
that is more 'real."'3 
I must confess that I have a somewhat divided mind with regard to 
Rorty's position on human rights. In my secular, naturalist musings I feel 
drawn to a Rortyan, sceptical view of moral rights. How could there be, 
within the confines of a neo-Darwinian, naturalist view of the world, any-
thing beyond the modern, Western rights vocabulary? I am perfectly will-
ing to disregard the use made of it by "relentless fat egos" (Murdoch's 
phrase) claiming their rights to work, paid vacations, the enjoyment of art 
and, ultimately, their right to happiness. Let us rather take the decent and 
compassionate people who claim for near or distant strangers their right 
to be granted asylum and immigration status in order to be protected from 
persecution and starvation. Yet, what is there to their claims other than a 
contingent narrative which one might hope to be rhetorically effective? Of 
course, if such rights have been recognised by a well-organised political 
community, there is something beyond the vocabulary. Then the rights are 
founded in and are derivable from laws and regulations administered by 
a capable government. But when those rights lack the support of enforce-
able laws and regulations, what remains is a more or less effective vocabu-
lary. The best that moral philosophers, working within a Rortyan natural-
ist philosophical framework, seem to be able to do is influence people's 
attitudes so as to expand their altruistic, compassionate sentiments. 
On the other hand-and now the other soul dwelling in my breast, 
shall I say my 'real' self, is speaking-I am deeply worried about such 
scepticism regarding the status of human rights as moral-as distinct 
from legal-rights. To overcome it, my proposal is to seriously consider 
reintroducing God into morality. My proposal will take the form of an 
argument, but not of a compelling kind, of course. Nevertheless, it is more 
than a mere suggestion which you can take or leave. 
Before I proceed, a preliminary point must be made. I assume that the 
most important rights are claim rights. It seems a reasonable assumption. 
Anyway, it is these rights which are the topic of my paper. If strangers 
have moral rights, then others-let us say we Westerners-have moral 
obligations.4 So if there are no moral obligations, there are no moral rights, 
and a fortiori no moral rights of strangers. I am inclined to agree with the 
correlativity thesis, that is, roughly, the idea that moral obligations and 
rights mutually imply each other. However, it is obligation that is histori-
cally and metaphysically the more basic notion. 
Moreover, since, generally, rights are benefits and obligations are bur-
dens, it is psychologically easier to claim the benefits of rights than to take 
on the burden of the obligations implied by them. I shall therefore deal 
with a moral rights scepticism only indirectly. My argument is levelled 
primarily at a scepticism towards what Bernard Williams has called "the 
peculiar institution of morality" in which moral obligations have pride 
of place. Moral rights stand or fall with moral obligations. The principal 
question, therefore, is whether the latter can stand. 
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The argument will initially unfold as a running comment on the devel-
opment of Williams's moral thinking. The reason is that his thought nicely 
exemplifies an interesting connection between a particular moral and re-
ligious scepticism. A first, tentative conclusion will be that a morality of 
real, inescapable and sometimes for the agent costly obligations, and their 
correlative rights, while being at home in a theistic metaphysic, does not 
seem to go together with a metaphysical, atheistic naturalism. Then I shall 
tum to Korsgaard in order to inquire whether her moral theory, which 
seems to be neutral towards theism and atheism, succeeds in giving an 
account of such obligations and rights. My second conclusion will be that 
her project, however impressive, has failed. The final conclusion of my 
paper will be that a theistic account of moral obligations, and of their cor-
relative rights, might succeed where non-theistic and atheistic accounts 
appear to founder. 
The Relation between Religious and Moral Thinking: 
The Case of Bernard Williams 
We owe to Williams a splendidly terse reason for the dismissal of the 
claim that morality is dependent on theistic religion: any appeal to God in 
morality "either adds nothing at all, or it adds the wrong sort of thing."5 
It is interesting to note, however, that Williams himself appears not fully 
to support the independence thesis. In his early Morality, from which the 
thesis originates,6 Williams is mainly interested in moral motivation. He 
is opposed to a dichotomy of the moral and the prudential. He acknowl-
edges a real distinction between morality and self-interest (71). But this 
does not imply that the moral and the prudential exclude each other. 
Moral motivation need not be exempt from prudential considerations 
(74,76). What is more important to my purposes is that, according to Wil-
liams, the distinction is not exhaustive. There is a plurality of consider-
ations to motivate us to do things of a desirable kind without these being 
'moral' or 'prudential' in a strict Kantian sense. Religious considerations 
such as love of God belong in this category (p. 77). I think Williams is 
right here. Religion does not necessarily add the wrong thing to moral-
ity, at least not if one is prepared to give up a narrowly moral, Kantian 
perspective and is willing to admit the affections into the moral domain. 
Religious attitudes are indeed a powerful source of morally good and 
praiseworthy behaviour? 
Williams, however, goes a step further. He acknowledges that a per-
son's relation with God not only can provide him with moral motivation, 
but also might enable him to see his moral obligations as stemming from 
that particular relation. Apart from the problem of its intelligibility, the 
God-man relationship might function as an acceptable foundation of mor-
al requirements (pp. 77-78). Again, I agree with Williams. But the criticism 
of the 'God adds nothing to morality' position should go deeper. There is 
a hidden assumption that morality is literally self-supporting. No theistic 
base is needed for a morality such as Williams has in view, that is a moral-
ity of overriding obligations. This presupposition is doubtful. 
At the time when Williams wrote his Morality, the controversy be-
tween prescriptivists and descriptivists was rampant. But Hare's variety 
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of utilitarianism based on the logic of moral concepts and relevant facts8 
turned out to be no more convincing than Sidgwick's earlier intuitionist 
variety. How could morality"s felt authority and binding force be derived 
from a person's prescriptive use of its concepts? On the other hand, one 
of the leading descriptivists of the time, Philippa Foot, came to view the 
requirements of common morality as no more than hypothetical impera-
tives the binding force of which depended on a person's contingent con-
cern or care for the moral life. For Foot, a morality of inescapable, costly 
moral obligations became one possibility among others which depended 
on a person's motivational set.9 A few years later, Mackie's error theory 
roused moral philosophers from their metaphysical slumber. First-order 
morality with its oughts and ought-nots presupposed a normative reality. 
An ought-to-be-ness seemed somehow to be built into the fabric of the 
world to the effect that moral requirements 'would be action-directing ab-
solutely, not contingently ... upon the agent's desires and inclinations.t]o 
However, according to Mackie, this cannot be so. In the light of what we 
know, through science, of the world, this moral realist view has to be re-
jected as being false. But note that Mackie acknowledged that such a mor-
al realism could be at home iln a Platonic or theistic worldY I shall come 
back to Mackie presently in the course of my sketch of the development 
of Williams's thinking on the relation between morality and religion. 
It is clear from his publications that Williams is familiar with the Chris-
tian religion. In an early piece of work he confesses himself to be a reli-
gious sceptic, not a believer.12 But he knows what Christianity is about: 
"Something must be believed, if religious activities are not just to be whis-
tling in the dark ... and something that connects God with the world of 
men." One of the candidate domains where God and men could be related 
is the moral world. Williams's problem with the Christian faith is that it is 
at least partly incomprehensible, and therefore difficult to accept as trueY 
At the time of Morality his position on religion appears to be in essentials 
the same, that is scepticism on the basis of incomprehensibility.14 But, as 
we have seen, there is no denial of the possible relevance of Christian the-
ism to morality. 
Things have changed considerably by the time of the publication of his 
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. The change is not revolutionary nor does 
it represent a break. It looks more like an evolution of his earlier thought. 
Let us take theism first. His initial religious scepticism turns out to have 
developed into atheism. Williams is prepared to recognise that if God ex-
ists, then arguments about him are of cosmic importance. But since God 
does not exist, he can have no impact on moral theory, for example in the 
form of a divine command theory, nor on moral practice (apart from the 
false beliefs of religious practitioners)P 
Now, I want to draw attention to a parallel development that is discern-
ible in Williams's thinking about 'the institution of morality.' Criticisms of 
'morality systems' with their emphasis on obligation, such as utilitarian-
ism and Kantianism, are already notable in his early publications. ln But his 
scepticism concerning moral obligations with their claim to overriding-
ness borders on outright rejection in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. No 
argument is at hand, according to Williams, to convince us of the power 
of our psychological capacities to intuit moral truth or, alternatively, to 
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frame universal rules of action which bind the will. There is an essential 
asymmetry between theoretical and practical reasoning. The latter, unlike 
the former, is unavoidably done from the first-person point of view, with 
an eye to this person's contingent wants and desires, concerns, and cares. 
It does not convert the reflective person necessarily into a being whose 
fundamental interest lies in the harmony of the interests of all, a harmony 
which can be established through the discovery of and compliance with 
universally valid moral obligations. Besides, and this is more than a casual 
observation, no authoritative entities like God or Reason are around to 
guide or pressure a recalcitrant will into this harmonyY 
So there is reason enough to downplay the importance of a morality 
system in which moral behaviour is primarily regulated by obligations. 
Even if they are still believed to be universally binding and overriding, 
they cannot withstand the test of reflection and the system is bound to 
be undermined. It is at this point that Williams objects to Mackie's afore-
mentioned 'error theory.' Although critical of particular details, Williams 
rejects not so much the theory as Mackie's claim that our first-order moral 
convictions need not be upset by the recognition that the phenomenology 
which gives rise to them is false. 1s He is willing to admit that in one respect 
the morality system is able to survive reflection: "We could recognize it as 
something that is necessary to have around."19 The system secures reliabil-
ity the absence of which would make life perhaps not nasty, brutish and 
short, but at least much more uncomfortable. However plausible this may 
be, there is no reason to assume that moral obligations have priority in 
an individual's deliberation. The categorical 'must' need not be connected 
with morality at all. It might be derived from all kinds of personal projects 
and relations in which one is emotionally and affectively engaged. 20 
A telling detail of the development of Williams's interconnected reli-
gious and ethical views is his turning to classical Greek ethical thought as 
expressed in tragedy. His explorations on this topic are avowedly under 
the influence of Nietzsche.2! As we know, Nietzsche was profoundly dis-
satisfied with the culture of his time dominated as it was by Christian-
ity. Kantian morality, according to Nietzsche, was a poor expression of 
rather than an alternative to it. But however critical he was of the Chris-
tian religion, Nietzsche saw sharply that giving up on God would bring 
in its course the loss of truth, obligation and confidence. Let me give 
one characteristic quotation: "How greatly we should like to exchange 
the false assertions of the priests that there is a God who requires right 
action from us ... who loves us and seeks the best for us in all our mis-
fortune-how greatly we would like to exchange these false assertions 
for truths which would be just as salutary, reassuring and beneficial as 
those errors. But there are no such truths."22 At this particular point too, 
Williams seems to have learnt from Nietzsche, or at least seems to be ba-
sically in agreement with him. There is no denying that his later thought 
reveals a Nietzschean connection.23 
The Prima Facie Transparency of a Religious Theory of Moral Obligation 
Why did I draw this admittedly short and rough sketch of the develop-
ment of this particular piece of Williams's thinking? First of all, since 
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Williams knows what Christian theism is about, it is possible for a think-
er from a fairly orthodox milieu to identify with him, if not completely 
then at least to a certain extent. I not only see the logic of his intellec-
tual moves, but also can imagine myself making them. Like the young 
Williams, I am not prepared to accept a non-realist and non-cognitivist 
interpretation of the Christian faith along Wittgensteinian and Braith-
waitean lines. If true, it has to do with the relation between a really ex-
isting person-like being and the world, especially the world of human 
beings. If God exists, his existence is indeed of cosmic importance and it 
is not far-fetched to believe that it is of some consequence for our view of 
reason and value in general and of morality in particular. Furthermore, 
the case of Williams shows what implications taking leave of God might 
have for one's moral thinking. The consequences I have in mind are of a 
logical rather than a psychological nature. There is a rationale underly-
ing them. Let me explain. 
Christine Korsgaard has developed the idea of a transparent ethical 
theory, transparency being a prerequisite for its success. Transparency 
involves a particular relation between the theory's explanatory and jus-
tificatory adequacy. A theory is explanatorily adequate only if it gives 
an account of a person's doing the morally right thing which is satis-
fying from the third-person point of view. But the explanation might 
undermine the justification and motivation which the person in ques-
tion has for doing the right thing. In that case, the theory is lacking in 
transparency. Note that in order to be transparent it is not enough that 
the explanation of the person's action must still hold when he under-
stands himself completely in terms of the theory. He might, for exam-
ple, continue to fulfil obligations which are costly to him even though 
he believes that an evolutionary theory is true, but his action would no 
longer be justifiable for him. It somehow would be irrational. To count 
as transparent, the ethical theory must be one that allows us to act in 
the full light of what morality is and why we are susceptible to its influ-
ences, and at the same time to believe that our actions are justified and 
make sense.24 
Now consider a father of five in wartime Holland who was asked to 
shelter a Jewish child-a stranger in her own country-from transporta-
tion to a concentration camp and likely death. He took the girl into his 
family and saved her life. He did so because he deemed it to be his in-
escapable obligation which he traced back to the will of God whom he 
trusted and loved. Some sixty years later a philosopher reflects on the 
case in the light of Korsgaard's idea of a transparent ethical theory. The 
explanation of the father's action is not in terms of biological or social 
science; it is of a metaphysical nature. But the metaphysical account does 
not undermine its justification. On the contrary, it lends support to it, as 
we shall see. 
"Obligation comes from law," says Korsgaard-upholding a long 
tradition-and "law is the bidding of a superior." The father, versed in 
biblical rather than philosophical literature, could have agreed. The law 
(of God) had a central place in his deliberations about what he morally 
ought to do. Secondly, according to Korsgaard, supernaturally revealed 
knowledge of God's will is not necessary for the knowledge of our moral 
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obligations. Again the father would not have objected. He knew from 
Paul's epistle to the Romans (chap. 1) that non-believers as well as believ-
ers are able to know God's will through reason if not through Scripture. 
Thirdly, Korsgaard avers, sanctions need not be the motive for obeying 
the sovereign will. If they were, morality could not be distinguished from 
prudence, nor moral laws from mere counsels. Morally obligatory ac-
tions proceed from the motive of duty.25 And once again, the father would 
have had reason to concur. He had several grounds to grant the request 
to hide the child from the Nazis, but among these there was no fear of 
divine sanctions. He felt deep concern for the girl, and his wife liked her 
at first sight. There were also great dangers involved for him, his wife and 
his children. Nevertheless, he neither decided to accept the girl into his 
house on the former grounds, nor decided to turn her away on the lat-
ter ground. He gave the girl shelter because he felt obligated. Taking her 
in was what he took to be God's will, that is, what he took to be morally 
required from him.26 
Thus a theistic metaphysic seems to be capable of providing the re-
sources not only for an illuminating account of moral obligation,27 but 
also for justifying and motivating a particular obligation's fulfilment in 
a concrete case. Transparency can be maintained. Conversely, if a theistic 
metaphysic is given up and replaced by a naturalist atheist metaphysic,28 
this move cannot but have repercussions in the moral thought which was 
supported by it. The transparency of a theory of overriding moral obliga-
tions becomes lost. And this, in my reconstruction, is what happened in 
the case of Williams. He gradually turned into a metaphysical nahlralist. 
The result was that the institution of morality with its inescapable and 
sometimes costly obligations came for him to hang in mid-air. This should 
not come as a surprise. For "what does broad reflective equilibrium de-
mand if not that we bring morality into some congruence with whatever 
else we hold in our going view of the world?"29 
What about Alternatives 
It may now be objected that one philosopher's progress from religious 
scepticism to atheism, with a parallel development in ethical thought 
from acceptance to denial of the possibility of there being objective, ines-
capable moral obligations-however plausible-is not sufficient for an ar-
gument establishing the incompatibility of metaphysical naturalism and 
the reality of inescapable moral obligations. Moreover, even if a realist 
theory of moral obligation might suitably be embedded in a theistic meta-
physic, this does not prevent such a theory from being developed within 
a metaphysical framework that is neutral towards theism and atheism. 
Both objections cut ice. A satisfying reply, however, would exceed the lim-
its of this paper. As far as the first point is concerned, a single observation 
must do. The suggestion I made earlier, namely that there is a 'logical' 
connection between metaphysical naturalism and the rejection of moral 
realism, is strengthened by the fact that philosophers of a metaphysical-
naturalist persuasion tend to reject the relevant moral realism. 3D Here, in 
addition to Mackie and Williams, I am thinking of philosophers such as 
David Gauthier, Simon Blackburn, and Richard Joyce. 
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Like Williams, Gauthier acknowledges, in an essay on Hobbes and 
Locke, the essential conceptual role God can play in a morality of over-
riding obligations. His sympathies are with Locke because of the latter's 
theocentrism which enables him to ground such a morality. Gauthier 
agrees with Locke that "[t]he taking away of God ... dissolves all," that is 
the elements of a strongly overriding morality. But he sides with Hobbes 
because Locke's theocentrism is an answer to the question of the founda-
tion of morality which "we no longer understand." 31 Hobbes' secular 
morality is founded in advantage. Gauthier's moral thinking over the 
years shows how he tries to make the best of Hobbes' fundamental idea.32 
Furthermore, those of us who have read Blackburn's Ruling Passions will 
have noticed how uneasily-to understate the matter-a morality of in-
escapable obligations (and moral realism in general) sits with his meta-
physical naturalism.33 In this connection, though the issue is not central 
to the moral realism I am dealing with, Blackburn's critique of Wiggins's 
Sensible Subjectivism view is worth mentioning. Wiggins holds that val-
ue properties and sensibilities for perceiving them are made for each oth-
er. It is the latter half-sensibilities being made for the properties-that, 
according to Blackburn, "really startles. Who or what makes them like 
that? (God? As we have seen, no natural [evolutionary] story explains 
how the ethical sensibilities of human beings were made for the ethical 
properties of things, so perhaps it is a supernatural story.)"34 Blackburn 
thus demonstrates not only his metaphysical-naturalist aversion to mor-
al realism but also his recognition of the coherence of moral realism with 
a theistic metaphysic. As to Joyce, thirdly, he argues in a recent study 
that "[n]atural selection has provided us with a tendency to invest the 
world with values that it does not contain, demands which it does not 
make." Our being aware of this tendency threatens to undermine our 
allegiance to a morality of binding obligations. Nevertheless, since it can-
not be denied that such a morality is useful, we should be prepared to 
make-believe acceptance of it.35 Things seem clear enough. It is the same 
old, naturalism inspired, projection theory that supports Joyce's moral 
'fictionalism' as it did earlier Mackie's and Blackburn's varieties of moral 
non-realism. 
Let us now turn to the second objection. I will deal with it in some 
greater detail by returning to Korsgaard and showing that she does not 
succeed in what she set out to do in her Sources of Normativity; that is to 
give-without having recourse to either a theistic or an atheistic meta-
physic-a vindication of the idea that costly moral obligations are real and 
inescapable. I take Korsgaard as my target because I consider her attempt 
to establish such a vindication to be the best of its kind. 
Korsgaard's Theory of Moral Obligation 
According to Korsgaard, doubt about the reality of costly moral obliga-
tions is a live option, if not under the pressures of life's exigencies then 
through developments in modern science and philosophy.36 The sceptical 
normative question "Is there really anything I must do and, if so, why?" 
is a reaction to commonplace confidence in moral norms and obligations. 
This confidence finds its philosophical expression in a particular realist 
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theory of value and obligation. The world in which we live has a nor-
mative dimension. It can be characterised as an ought-to-be-ness. Thus, 
knowledge of the world can provide insight into what we have reason to 
do. Korsgaard is critical of this position. Her main point is that this type of 
moral realism presupposes confidence in normativity, that is, in the real-
ity of moral norms and obligations. And this is exactly the problem for the 
moral sceptic (pp. 37-41). The answer to the normative question is there-
fore not to be sought in an objective, external world of normative facts or 
objective reasons, but in the subjective, internal world of one's own mind. 
Reflection is the key to the sceptic's problem. Following the lead of Hume 
and Williams, Korsgaard says: 
Obligations and values are projections of our own moral sentiments 
and dispositions. To say that these sentiments and dispositions are 
justified is ... to say that they are good. We are the better for having 
them .... But the normative question is one that arises in the heat 
of action. It is as agents that we must do what we are obligated to 
do, and it is as agents that we demand to know why. So it is not just 
our dispositions, but rather the particular motives and impulses that 
spring from them, that must seem to us to be normative .... Each 
impulse as it offers itself to the will must pass a kind of test for nor-
mativity before we can adopt it as a reason for action. (p. 91) 
The test is one of reflective endorsement. How does this test come about, 
and when is it successful? At this point, Korsgaard's thinking takes a 
decisive Kantian turn. From the deliberative perspective, motives or im-
pulses-desires, in short-provide suggestions for action which we can 
accept or reject. We can act on a particular desire if it can withstand re-
flective scrutiny, that is, if we can will it to be a law. This law is formal. 
It is a categorical imperative with no definite content. But it is not Kant's 
law of Reason. Unlike Kant's law, Korsgaard's does not transcend the 
individual person. On the contrary, it is precisely the law of a single per-
son with a particular identity. The identity concerned is a practical not 
a theoretical one. Practical identity is to be understood as "a description 
under which you value yourself" (p. 101). Since it is in different roles 
and from different perspectives that a person finds her life to be worth 
living and her actions to be worth undertaking, practical identity is a 
kind of container concept.37 It comprises a jumble of conceptions of the 
person, for example, that of mother, friend, citizen of a particular coun-
try, etc. Now, while deliberating about on what desire to act, the thinking 
self legislates for the acting self in the light of the several conceptions of 
his identity. Can I act on this desire-can I will this as a law-being a 
mother, or a friend, a citizen, etc.? If I can, I have a reason to act. On the 
other hand, if I cannot, I have an obligation. As Korsgaard puts it: "An 
obligation always takes the form of a reaction against a threat of a loss of 
identity" (p. 102). Note that obligation is dependent on value. My obliga-
tions spring from my complex identity, which in turn is derived from the 
worth I find in my life, roles and projects. So value is the ultimate source 
of obligation. 
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This view of obligations is not without its problems. In the first place, 
since my identity is complex, what I cannot do in one conception of my-
self-as a mother, say-I cannot leave undone in another conception of 
myself, for example, as a friend. What must I do? The solution is that not 
all parts of our identity are equally important to us. Some parts are easily 
shed and should be shed when they are in conflict with a part that, in our 
view, is more fundamental. Another problem-one that is more difficult 
to solve and more important to my purposes-concerns the special sta-
tus of moral obligations. Let us first turn to the question what Korsgaard 
holds to be special about them. The key to answering this is a correct 
understanding of the notion of moral identity. Whereas non-moral con-
ceptions of the self can be more or less fundamental, and can more or 
less easily be shed, a person's moral identity is the fundamental one and 
cannot be shed. It is inescapable. The reason is that this particular iden-
tity is neither more or less local nor contingent. Unlike the other identi-
ties, moral identity is universal, at least in the "world we live in, the one 
brought about by the Enlightenment." In this world, people are Kantian 
Citizens of the Kingdom of Ends (pp. 117, 121-22). The necessity of moral 
identity has to do with the value each person attaches to herself and, as a 
Kantian Citizen, inevitably also to others (p. 132). Without this value, one 
would not have other identities which, as we have seen, are based on it. 
Why does valuing humanity in your own person imply valuing it in that 
of others? Korsgaard's argument here hinges on the public, that is, the 
shareable nature of reasons. She sees an analogy between the publicity of 
reasons and that of linguistic meaning. Reasons can as well be shared as 
can the meaning of words: "You can no more take the reasons of another 
to be mere pressure than you can take the language of another to be mere 
noise" (p. 143). 
The inescapability of moral identity seems to suggest that moral ob-
ligations are also inescapable. Is it more than a suggestion? Korsgaard's 
answer appears to be yes and no. Since we necessarily have a moral iden-
tity and having an identity implies having obligations, we inescapably 
have moral obligations-things "we owe to each other," to use Thomas 
Scanlon's apt phrase. But this does not mean that those moral obligations 
should always win the day when in conflict with other obligations. They 
are not inescapable in the sense that they necessarily override the latter. 
As Korsgaard puts it, there is no "reason why the laws of the Kingdom 
of Ends should have more force than the laws of a Kingdom of Two" 
(p. 128). It is up to the person who is facing the conflicting requirements 
to decide which of them is the more weighty. Moreover-and here she 
acknowledges a debt to Nietzsche-"there are limits to the depth of ob-
ligation." Obligation, and not solely moral obligation, should not get out 
of control. In order to accomplish this, "[m]aybe, a little distance [from 
obligation] is all we need" (p. 160). There is a paradox here. Obligations 
are bound up with the preservation of identity, that is, with the control 
of self. The idea now is that self-control should not get out of control, in 
order to prevent life from going to pieces under its burden. The solution is 
that identity can be maintained even when, at times, control is eased and 
obligation is not heeded. 
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But now failure looms large for Korsgaard's project. What she set out 
to do was give a convincing account of the reality and inescapability of 
costly moral obligations. What we have discovered, however, is that moral 
obligations are not inescapable after all. As to the reality of moral obliga-
tions, they are derived from and thus dependent on moral identity. How 
real, in the sense of necessary and universal, is this identity? Its universal-
ity is relativised because it is claimed only for the Enlightenment world 
in which we live. And the necessity of moral identity, being based on the 
value of self and others, is questionable because one may have doubts if 
not about one's own value, then surely about the necessary connection 
between valuing humanity in your own person and valuing it in that of 
others. I have no problems with Korsgaard's analogy, which she makes 
in the course of her argument, between the shareability of reasons and 
that of linguistic meaning. Practical reasons indeed can be shared. But 
there is a big difference between sharing the reasons of another person in 
the sense of understanding them, and sharing them in the sense of mak-
ing them your own, that is, of investing them with authority. Korsgaard, 
as we have seen, emphasises the point that a particular desire of mine 
as such has no normative force. Before it can acquire the status of nor-
mative reason for me, it must first be reflectively endorsed by me. Now, 
my desire having passed my test of reflective endorsement does not yet 
mean that it has passed another person's test of reflective endorsement. 
What is a normative reason for me is not automatically a normative rea-
son for someone else, and the other way around. I think Korsgaard would 
agree. She could qualify her position-as in fact she might have done-by 
stressing not the actuality but the possibility of my normative reason be-
ing shared by another person?8 But that is still too weak a foundation 
to support the putative necessary connection between the value of one's 
own life and that of one's fellow human beings. So Korsgaard's argument 
for the necessity of moral identity by establishing a necessary connection 
between valuing humanity in your own person and valuing it in that of 
others seems to fail. Moreover, even if we would grant its necessity, moral 
identity is not very deep. We have seen that the reflective self is always 
free to overrule the claims of his necessary moral identity with an appeal 
to a contingent non-moral identity. How real, then, are moral obligations? 
Their reality cannot surpass that of moral identity, from which they are 
derived. This means that their reality is at best only local and superficial, 
and questionable at that. 
Thus it appears that, in Korsgaard's account, moral obligations are nei-
ther inescapable nor, in a strong sense, real. Her project seems to have 
foundered. If we want it to succeed, we must try another tack. My propos-
al is to tum to a divine command theory of moral obligation, the contours 
of which I drew in an earlier section. 
A Strong Divine COlIzmand Theory of Moral Obligation 
Here I shall just give a somewhat more detailed sketch of my thoughts 
on a divine command theory (henceforth OCT), with an eye to the ques-
tion how human rights claims might be theoretically strengthened. First 
of all, I am not particularly interested in a weak OCT such that being 
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commanded by God is sufficient for an action to be morally obligatory. 
Thus, if God has commanded that we should not take innocent human 
life then, on the weak theory, we have the moral obligation not to do so. 
The weak theory does not preclude that the taking of innocent human life 
is morally prohibited on grounds which have nothing to do with God's 
wilI.39 But my argument so far has been precisely that such grounds are 
hard to find. We should therefore opt for a more challenging version of 
OCT that makes God's command not only sufficient, but also necessary 
for there being a moral requirement. It might go something like this: for 
all actions A and persons P, A is morally obligatory for P if and only if 
God commands P to do A. Thus there is a symmetrical relation between 
an action being commanded by God and its being morally obligatory. The 
principle tells us both that being commanded by God is logically neces-
sary and sufficient for being morally obligatory, and that being morally 
obligatory is logically necessary and sufficient for being commanded by 
God. But this position is not satisfactory for the divine command theorist. 
A strong OCT should capture the idea that an action being commanded 
by God somehow explains its being obligatory, rather than the other way 
round. So I am happy to follow Philip Quinn in his attempt to unpack this 
asymmetry in terms of metaphysical dependence: if it is morally obliga-
tory that P do A at time t, then by commanding that P do A at t God brings 
it about that it is morally obligatory that P do A at t. 40 
Let me say here a few things on an important, but I think mistaken 
point which Mark Murphy recently made regarding this 1/ causal" OCT, 
as he calls it. The fact that, on the basis of this particular meta-ethical 
theory, moral obligations are inextricably bound up with divine com-
mands is, in Murphy's view, no ground for thinking that these com-
mands themselves constitute reasons, if only partially, to perform any 
act. He clarifies his view of the relation between divine commands and 
moral obligations in this meta-ethical theory with an analogy: "It would 
be no more appropriate for one to talk about God's command in one's 
normative account of why one ought to keep promises than it would 
be for one to talk about the complete evolutionary history of the pain 
mechanism in providing a normative account of why one ought not to 
inflict needless pain."41 
The first thing to say is that meta-ethics and normative ethics cannot 
be kept apart, not even in the case of an austere meta-ethical theory such 
as the causal OCT. Normative ethics are developed from or imply meta-
ethical positions. And, conversely, meta-ethical theories have implications 
which bear on one's normative views. Secondly, and more importantly, 
Murphy seems to be quite confident about there really being moral obli-
gations in the world. I should be surprised to learn that this confidence is 
unrelated to his theistic view of the world, as I was not surprised to dis-
cover the connection between Williams's tum to atheism and his becom-
ing sceptical of the existence, or at least of the binding force of moral obli-
gations. Reference to God and his will in answering the question why one 
is obligated not to inflict needless pain is surely to the point in a time that is 
sceptical of the reality and binding force of moral obligations, "if not un-
der the pressure of life's exigencies then through developments in modem 
science and philosophy," whereas reference to the complete evolutionary 
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history of the pain mechanism is completely beside the point as an answer 
to the question why one should not inflict needless pain. This particular 
history seems rather suited to explain away the obligation. Transparency 
of one's normative ethical position requires that it is not separated from 
one's meta-ethical background beliefs. 
Now, having made this short digression, let us return to our strong 
conception of OCT. What does and does not follow from it? The first thing 
to note is that if God does not exist, there are no moral obligations and, by 
implication, no moral rights. (As we have seen, Williams comes close to 
this conclusion.) On the other hand, it is not a valid inference that, if God 
does not exist, everything is permitted and a person is without restraints 
in his dealings with his fellow human beings. What is true is that, in the 
case of God's non-existence, there are no moral obligations and rights, and 
morally everything is permitted. But that is a far cry from there being no 
obligations and rights at all, with the result that absolutely everything is 
permitted. One should not overlook the fact that the state and its laws 
create legal obligations and legal rights. Furthermore, irrespective of the 
truth of OCT, people are generally subject to feelings of moral obligation 
and feel inclined to respect moral rights. It must be admitted, however, 
that such feelings are liable to disappear when one no longer believes that 
moral obligations and their correlative rights really exist.42 Another rea-
son, perhaps, for not being too worried about the practical effects of the 
combined belief in OCT and God's non-existence is that there is an impor-
tant alternative to a God-based morality system, viz. a system in which 
not the deontic but the aretaic concepts have pride of place, that is, a virtue 
ethics. Thus, even though there might be no moral rights implying moral 
obligations to perform certain actions and to refrain from performing oth-
ers, it might be wise, good or praiseworthy to perform the former, and 
unwise, bad or contemptible to perform the latter.43 
Secondly, because OCT is silent on the way the divine will is made 
known, it does not follow from the theory that God's commands are ex-
clusively mediated through Scripture or the Church. Since the theory has 
the form of a logical equivalence, it is in principle possible to derive the 
content of the commanding will of God, constituting moral obligations 
and rights, from natural human knowledge of what is morally required 
and of what can be morally claimed. This particular knowledge could be 
acquired through a method of moral truth finding which is not necessarily 
of a theological nature.44 
Then there is the classic quandary of what makes God's commands 
authoritative-or, in other words, what makes his commanding will mor-
ally good-if it is granted that might does not make right. Now, if God is 
represented as a liar and a cheat-as the gods were in traditional Greek 
religious thought, with which Plato was familiar-there is a real problem. 
And the problem is still with us if God is conceived as the demiurge-
creator who, in his creation of the world, is bound by an independent 
idea of the good. For, in the latter case, it is not God but the good that is 
ultimately the ground of obligation.45 However, God as worshipped in 
the Christian tradition is not only almighty but also perfectly good, both 
morally and non-morally. Note that God's moral goodness need not, and 
should not, be construed as consisting in his practising what he preaches. 
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God is under no obligation. He acts from his goodness. Nor should God's 
overall goodness be taken to be derived from a source outside his nature. 
God himself is the supreme standard of goodness. If we look upon God in 
this manner, the problem we faced dissolves.46 
Now, it is not enough for the acceptability of a theory that questions 
and objections to it can be answered (and many more could be raised). So 
let me finally mention a few positive reasons for my support of a strong 
OCT. The first is that, unlike Korsgaard's theory, OCT is able to account 
not only for the reality but also for the inescapability of moral obligations. 
Nobody can get off the hook of a particular costly moral obligation by re-
minding him- or herself, a la Korsgaard, of the limits of moral obligations 
in general, and by taking distance from a particular one. For moral obli-
gations are ultimately not self-imposed, as with Korsgaard, but divinely 
imposed. Furthermore, OCT sits easily with the theocentric Christian tra-
dition which has nurtured me religiously. Philosophically I see no ground 
to turn my back on it. Last but not least, the theory enables us to ward off 
a Rortyan sceptical attack on the reality of human rights. And here I have 
come full circle to the point where I began this paper. So it is time to draw 
a conclusion. 
Conclusion 
The principal question which I set out to answer was whether, since moral 
rights and obligations stand or fall together, the latter can stand, that is, 
whether they are real and inescapable. A first conclusion was that a moral-
ity of real, inescapable and-for the agent-sometimes costly obligations 
and their correlative rights, while being at home in a theistic metaphysic, 
fits in badly with metaphysical, atheistic naturalism. The second conclu-
sion was that Christine Korsgaard's impressive ethical project, which is 
neutral towards theism and atheism, fails to give a satisfying account of 
such obligations. My final claim was that a theistic account in terms of a 
strong divine command theory succeeds where non-theistic and atheistic 
accounts seem to founder.47 
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